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Since the adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act2 ("DMCA") in 1998, the courts have failed to fully define the
scope of which copyrighted works are protected by the anti-
circumvention provisions.3 Courts have struggled to define this
scope because Congress promulgated the DMCA in the context of
promoting commerce over the Internet.4 Congress, however,
drafted the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions with such broad
and arguably unambiguous language5 that courts have been hard-
pressed to limit the application of the provisions to Internet
commerce. 6 Yet, not until Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components7 had a court interpreted the scope of the anti-
circumvention provisions as broad enough to protect purely
functional, not independently marketed, copyrighted works. 8
This Recent Development uses Lexmark as a case study
and comes to the conclusion that although the anti-circumvention
provisions seem to apply to the Lexmark facts courts should not
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
2 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998)).
' 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
4 THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2
(1998) [hereinafter DMCA S. REP.].
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C).
6 See Sony Computer Entm't v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sony Computer Entm't v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
7 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 943-74 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (trial scheduled for May 2004).
8 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Law Professors at 7, Lexmark (No. 02-571-KSF), at
http://www.scc-inc.com/special/oemwarfare/lexmark vs scc.htm (Jan. 30,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
[hereinafter Lexmark Amicus Brief].
allow plaintiffs to use the anti-circumvention provisions to protect
purely functional and not independently marketed copyrighted
works because doing so leads to outcomes that are contrary to
public policy.
This Recent Development first examines the history of the
creation of the DMCA and the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions. Next, this Recent Development considers the Lexmark
case and analyzes the reasoning the Lexmark court used to
determine the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of its
anti-circumvention claim. Against this backdrop, this Recent
Development considers the policy implications of allowing
plaintiffs to use the anti-circumvention provisions to protect purely
functional, not independently marketed, copyrighted works. This
Recent Development then argues that because of negative policy
implications, the Lexmark court should not have applied the anti-
circumvention provisions. Finally, this Recent Development
briefly examines Real Networks Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., a case in
which a court correctly applied the anti-circumvention provisions.
I. History and Purpose of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act
As mandated by the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty, 9 Congress codified the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998.10 Congress
promulgated the DMCA to "facilitate the robust development and
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications,
research, development, and education in the digital age." 1 When
enacting the law, Congress focused on the narrow topics of
electronic commerce and online marketplaces, as evidenced in the
Senate Report: 12
9 See World Intellectual Prop. Org. Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 105-17 (1998) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
10 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
11 DMCA S. REP., supra note 4, at 2.
12 Id.
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The law must adapt in order to make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit
copyrighted materials .... Title I of this bill
provides this protection and creates the legal
platform for launching the global digital online
marketplace for copyrighted works. It will also
make available via the Internet the movies, music,
software, and literary works that are the fruit of the
American creative genius.13
In brief, the Senate and House of Representatives reports
denote the following reasons for enacting the DMCA: (1) to make
online marketplaces "a safe place to disseminate and exploit
copyrighted materials,"'14 (2) to adapt the law so as to create rights
in an "unregulated and beneficial environment,"''15 (3) to encourage
trade in electronic works over the Internet,16 and (4) to bring the
electronic marketplace co yright law in line with standard
American copyright law. 1V
13 id.
14 Id. ("The law must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials. The legislation implementing the
treaties, Title I of this bill, provides this protection and creates the legal platform
for launching the global digital online marketplace for copyrighted works.").
15 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105th CONG., SECTION-BY-
SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281, 2 (Comm. Print 1998) ("The digital
environment now allows users of electronic media to send and retrieve perfect
reproductions easily and nearly instantaneously, to and from locations around
the works. With this evolution in technology, the law must adapt in order to
make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit materials in which
American citizens have rights in an unregulated and beneficial environment.").
16 H.R. REP. No. 105-511, at 10 (1998) ("When copyrighted material is
adequately protected in the digital environment, a plethora of works will be
distributed and performed over the Internet. In order to protect the owner,
copyrighted works will most likely be encrypted and made available to
consumers once payment is made for access to a copy of the work.").
17 144 CONG. REC. 4435, 4440 (1998) (Sen. Leahy stated, "The bill addresses
the problems caused when copyrighted works are disseminated through the
Internet and other electronic transmissions without the authority of the copyright
owner. By establishing clear rules of the road, this bill will allow electronic
commerce to flourish in a way that does not undermine America's copyright
community.").
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All of the stated reasons for enacting the DMCA apply to
building consumer confidence in the Internet. Yet, in the process
of creating the legislation, Congress never addressed whether the
DMCA should protect electronic works that are not disseminated
by means of the Internet.18 Congress also failed to address whether
the anti-circumvention provisions apply to protect purely
functional, not independently marketed, copyrighted works.' 9 As
discussed in Part III, the broad wording 20 of the anti-circumvention
provisions leads to the conclusion that both works that are not
disseminated through means of the Internet and purely functional,
not independently marketed, copyrighted works fall within the
class of works protected by the anti-circumvention provisions.
III. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA
The Information Infrastructure Task Force Working Group
on Intellectual Property Rights was the first group to discuss the
anti-circumvention provisions. 21 It did so in a 1995 report 22 that
recommended that the United States encourage the international
community to adopt a provision similar to the eventual 17 U.S.C.
23§ 1201(a). During treaty talks before the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), the United States, following the
Task Force's recommendation, took the position that the anti-
18 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998); see text on legislative history infra Part II.
19 See infra text on legislative history Part II.
20 See infra text on legislative history Part III.
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
22 See generally THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, S. REP
No. 105-190, at 2 (1998); Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 3-4 (citing
BRUCE A. LEHMAN, "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE" THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP., app. 1 at 6 (1995)).23 Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 3-4 ("No person shall import,
manufacture or distribute any device product or component incorporated into a
device or product, or offer or perform any service, the primary purpose or effect
of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent,
without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process treatment,
mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the violation of any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner under § 106.") (citing LEHMAN, supra
note 22, at app. 1 at 6).
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circumvention provisions should be added to the WIPO Copyright
Treaty.24 Other countries considering the treaty supported this
recommendation, and the provisions were ultimately mandated by
treaty as follows:
Contracting parties shall provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures
that are used by authors in connection with the
exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect
of their works, which are not authorized by the
authors concerned or permitted by law. 25
After signing the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Congress
complied with this WIPO provision. In order to "ensure a thriving
electronic marketplace for copyrighted works on the Internet," 26
Congress added anti-circumvention provisions to the DMCA.
The applicable anti-circumvention provisions are codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 1201. The text of§ 1201(a)(1)(A) states, "No
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title." Section
1201 (a)(2) provides,
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a
work under this title;
(B) has only a limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent
protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or
24 S. REP No. 105-190, at 2; Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 3-4.
25 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 9.
26 H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, at 9 (1998).
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(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.
27
Senate Report 105-10928 explains that these9rovisions are
"designed to protect access to a copyrighted work." 9 The report
goes on to explain why the anti-circumvention provisions are
necessary:
The prohibition in [§] 120 1(a)(1) is necessary
because prior to this Act, the conduct of
circumvention was never before made unlawful.
The device limitation in [§] 1201(a)(2) enforces this
new prohibition on conduct. The copyright law has
long forbidden copyright infringements, so no new
prohibition was necessary. The device limitation in
[§] 1201(b) enforces the longstanding prohibitions
on infringements.
30
The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions were added to
strengthen copyright law. Through § 1201(a)(1), Congress
buttressed the protections of copyright law by punishing not only
those who infringe a copyright but also those who circumvent
effective technological measures in order to gain access to a
copyrighted work. Section 1201(a)(2) further strengthens the
protections of copyright law by making it illegal for manufacturers,
retailers, and others to deal in products that are primarily used to
circumvent technological measures that control access to
copyrighted works.
27 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C).(1998).
28 S. REP. No. 105-190, at 12.
29 id.
30 id.
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IV. Facts and Holding of Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components
3 1
The Lexmark corporation designed and implemented a
business strategy that enabled owners of certain Lexmark printers
to buy either an ink cartridge at the regular price or a "prebate" ink
32 3cartridge at a discounted price.33 A prebate is similar to a rebate,
but with a prebate there is no need to send in a receipt to acquire a
refund. Instead, the consumer accepts an agreement and is offered
an on-the-spot discount. For instance, in Lexmark, by opening the
prebate cartridge packaging, consumers accepted an agreement
34
that required them to return their spent prebate cartridge to
Lexmark after the initial use and prohibited them from refilling the
spent cartridge. To ensure compliance, Lexmark manufactured the
prebate cartridges with a microchip that prevented their
compatibility with a Lexmark printer if the cartridges had been
refilled.35
Static Control Components ("SCC") manufactured a
microchip designed to circumvent the authentication sequence that
prevented the use of refilled prebate printer cartridges in Lexmark
printers.36 Consequentially, Lexmark sought to enjoin SCC from
"making, selling, distributing, offering for sale, or otherwise
trafficking" 37 in these microchips. In its complaint, Lexmark
31 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 943-74 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (trial scheduled for May 2004).
32 Id. at 947.
33 id.
34 Id. at 947 n. 1 ("The Prebate agreement states as follows: 'RETURN EMPTY
CARTRIDGE TO LEXMARK FOR REMANUFACTURING AND
RECYCLING. Please read before opening. Opening this package or using the
patented cartridge inside confirms your acceptance of the following
license/agreement. This all-new cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a
restriction that it may be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to
return the empty cartridge only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling.
If you don't accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of
purchase. A regular price cartridge without these terms is available."').
31 Id. at 948.
36 d. at 947.
37 Id. at 974; see Complaint at 14, Lexmark (No. 02-571-KSF), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCAJ20030108lexmark-v-static-controlcomponents
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asserted three causes of action: (1) the SCC microchip "infringes
Lexmark's copyright in its 'Toner Loading Programs"'; 38 (2) the
SCC microchip circumvents a technology measure that effectively
controls access to Lexmark's Toner Loading Programs in violation
of the anti-circumvention provisions of sections 1201(a)(2)(A),
(B), and (C) of the DMCA;39 and (3) the SCC microchip
circumvents a technological measure that effectively controls
access to Lexmark's Printer Engine Program in violation of the
anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) of
the DMCA.4 °
The court granted the preliminary injunction against SCC,
holding that "Lexmark... demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits of its ... claims under section 1201 (a)(2) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.
4 1
V. The Lexmark Court's Reasoning in Deciding to Apply
the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions 4
A. Adopting Lexmark's Theory of the Case
By concluding that the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions applied in Lexmark,43 the court agreed with Lexmark's
theory of the case.4 Lexmark's theory was that SCC created
microchips to circumvent a protection measure known as
.pdf (Dec. 30, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) [hereinafter Lexmark Complaint].38 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also Lexmark Complaint, supra note 37,
at 10.
39 See Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also Lexmark Complaint, supra
note 37, at 10.40 See Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 974; see also Lexmark Complaint, supra
note 37, at 11.
4 1 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
42 This section will briefly explain the court's reasoning in applying the DMCA
anti-circumvention provisions; a more in-depth analysis will follow in part VI of
this Recent Development which will explain some failings in the Lexmark
court's reasoning and why it should not have applied the anti-circumvention
provisions.
43 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 967-69.
44 See id. at 968-69.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
"Lexmark's Authentication Sequence" that controlled access to the
Lexmark Printer Engine Program and the Toner Loading Program,
both of which are protected by copyright. 45 The purposes of these
46copyrighted works were functional in nature. The Printer Engine
Program "controls various operations of the printer including, for
example, paper feed, paper movement, motor control, fuser
operation, and voltage control for the electrophotographic...
system.",47 The Toner Loading Programs "reside within
microchips attached to the toner cartridges... [and] enable the
printers to aproximate the amount of toner remaining in the
cartridges." 8 The court, adopting Lexmark's theory of the case,
determined that SCC had indeed created microchips to circumvent
the Lexmark authentication process to gain access to these non-
tangible, functional, copyrighted components of certain Lexmark
printers.49
B. The Court's Analysis of the Words Used in the
Provisions
After adopting Lexmark's theory of the case, the court
considered whether the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions
were applicable to the facts of the case. In making this
determination, the court first considered the definitions of the
words used in the anti-circumvention provisions, as provided in
§ 1201(a)(3):
(A) to "circumvent a technological measure" means
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner; and
(B) a technological measure "effectively controls
access to a work" if the measure, in the ordinary
45 See Lexmark Complaint, supra note 37, at 11.
46 See Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 948-49.
4 7 Id. at 948.481 Id. at 949.
4 9 Id. at 955.
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course of its operation, requires the application
of information, or a process or a treatment, with
the authority of the copyright owner, to gain
access to the work.50
Because "access" is not expressly defined in the DMCA,
the court gave "access" an ordinary meaning by using Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. That dictionary defines "access"
as the "ability to enter, to obtain, or to make use of."'"
Based on these definitions, the Lexmark court decided that
the wording of the anti-circumvention provisions was
52unambiguous. Having determined the statute to be unambiguous,
the court applied a well-known rule of statutory interpretation:
"When a statute is unambiguous, resort[ing] to legislative history
and policy considerations is improper., 53 Yet, even if the
legislative history had been considered, it is unclear whether these
purely functional, not independently marketed, copyright
components of the Lexmark printers should have been protected
under the anti-circumvention provisions because Congress failed to
discuss the scope of those provisions.
C. Reliance on Sony Computer Entertainment America
v. Gamemasters 
4
Having determined that the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions were applicable to Lexmark's theory of the case, the
court had to determine whether the Lexmark claim was novel and
whether it should be distinguished from other cases in which the
anti-circumvention provisions had been used. In making the
determination that the claim was not novel, the court relied
heavily 55 on Sony Computer Entertainment America v.
'0 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1998).
55 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1999)).
52 Id. at 967.
53 In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2000).
54 Sony Computer Entm't Am. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
55 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
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Gamemasters.56 In Gamemasters, the defendant designed a device
called the Game Enhancer.57 The court found that
the Game Enhancer ... permit[ed] players to play
games sold in Japan or Europe and intended by
SCEA for use exclusively on Japanese or European
PlayStation consoles.
The Game Enhancer circumvents the mechanism on
the PlayStation console that ensures the console
operates only when encrypted data is read from an
authorized CD-ROM.
58
Based on this finding, the Gamemasters court decided that Sony,
the plaintiff, was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim and
granted Sony a preliminary injunction in order to prevent the
alleged irreparable harm.
Gamemasters dealt with standard video games, electronics
that were not distributed over the Internet. The decision in
Gamemasters and similar cases to apply the anti-circumvention
provisions, although there was no Internet commerce, likely
persuaded the Lexmark court that the anti-circumvention
provisions should apply to the Lexmark facts.
6 1
After making the determination that the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions apply to standard electronics that were
not used via the Internet, the court then considered whether the
Lexmark claim was novel. It read the Gamemasters decision as
using the anti-circumvention provisions to protect purely
functional, not independently marketed, copyrighted components
inside the PlayStation console and, therefore, found that the
Lexmark facts were similar to the Gamemasters claim and that
56 87 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
57 Id. at 981.
58 Id. at 981, 987.59 See id. at 989-90.60 Id.; Sony Computer Entm't v. Connectix Corp, 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
61 See Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 989-90; Connectix, 203 F.3d at 609-10.
FALL 2003]
62Lexmark was not novel. Thus, the court found no reason to
differentiate Lexmark from Gamemasters.6
3
VI. Improper Versus Proper Application of the Anti-
Circumvention Provisions
A. The Application of the Anti-Circumvention
Provisions in Lexmark
1. Lexmark's Theory of the Case
The Lexmark court made its first error by adopting
Lexmark's theory of the case and applying the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions to these facts. There are two ways to
view the Lexmark case. The district court and Lexmark
characterized SCC's actions as manufacturing a microchip that
circumvented an authentication sequence that effectively
controlled access to two purely functional, not independently
marketed, copyrighted works: the Printer Engine and the Toner
Loading System.64 The better interpretation, however, is that SCC
manufactured a microchip that circumvented an authentication
sequence to enable compatibility between Lexmark printers and
non-copyrighted refilled prebate cartridges.
The second approach is better because neither consumers
who used the microchips nor SCC was interested in circumventing
the authentication sequence in order to gain access to the Printer
Engine and Toner Loading System. SCC did not want to learn
about the internal components so as to implement such
components into its own products or make a commercial use of the
internal components. Rather, SCC had an interest in
circumventing a technological measure that controlled access to
functional components of the printer in order to create
compatibility between printers and non-copyrighted refilled
prebate printer cartridges.
62 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,
970 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
63 See id.
(A Id. at 947 n. 1.
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2. Novelty of the Lexmark Claim
The Lexmark court also erred when it decided that the
DMCA claim was not novel.65 This decision was based on the
court's unique interpretation of the Gamemasters decision. There
are, however, two ways to look at Gamemasters, and the
preliminary injunction order66 makes it unclear which of the two
analyses the Gamemasters court applied.
The first interpretation of the case favors a finding that the
issue in Lexmark was not novel because the facts were similar to
those in Gamemasters. The second, more preferable, interpretation
favors a finding that the Lexmark claims were indeed novel.
i. One Interpretation of Gamemasters
The first method of interpreting Gamemasters finds that the
Game Enhancer was used to circumvent an authentication process
within the PlayStation console to gain access to purely functional,
not independently marketed components inside the console. This
seems to be the way the Lexmark court viewed the case since it
described Gamemasters as "enjoining sale of [a] device that
circumvented [a] technological measure that prevented access to
software embedded in Sony's PlayStation console, even though the
device did not facilitate piracy." 67 Under this approach, Lexmark
does look quite similar to Gamemasters because, using Lexmark's
construction of the facts,68 the SCC microchip circumvented an
authentication process and gave SCC and consumers access to
functional components of the printer, the Printer Engine Program,
and the Toner Loading System.
65 Id. at 970.
66 See Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 989-90.
67 See Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (emphasis added).
61 See id. at 968-69.
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ii. A Better Interpretation of
Gamemasters
The better interpretation of Gamemasters, however, focuses
on protection of the CD-ROM rather than protection of the
functional aspects of the console. According to this interpretation,
the defendant used the Game Enhancer to circumvent an
authentication measure to gain access to non-territorial PlayStation
CD-ROMs, which are protected by copyright. Such use, involving
circumvention of a-protection measure to gain access to an
independently marketed, not purely functional, copyrighted work
is the typical scenario in which courts have allowed the anti-
circumvention provisions to be applied.69 This interpretation of
Gamemasters shows that it involves protection of independently
marketed, not purely functional copyrighted goods, i.e. PlayStation
CD-ROMs. Lexmark, on the other hand, involves protection of
purely functional, not independently marketed, internal
components of the Lexmark printer. Thus, the Lexmark claim was
novel.
Despite the novelty of the Lexmark claim, it seems that the
court was correct in applying the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions, given their broad language. But, as explained below in
Part 3, to expand the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions to
cover purely functional, not independently marketed components
of electronics raises other important concerns and could result in
dire public policy consequences.
3. Application of the Anti-Circumvention
Provisions and Public Policy
i. Applying the DMCA
The court in Lexmark erred by failing to fully assess the
various policy concerns surrounding its holding. Furthermore, the
court failed to consider the implications of allowing the anti-
circumvention provisions to be applied on the Lexmark facts.
69 See, e.g., Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
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Lexmark's attempt to prohibit the refill and reuse of their printer
cartridges is a clear indication of their desire to gain a quasi-
monopoly in the resale market of printer cartridges. Public policy
concerns regarding anti-competitive behavior should have
prevented the court from allowing Lexmark from doing so. SCC
does not supply chips to facilitate the theft of Toner Loading
Programs and Printer Engine Programs. Rather, SCC supplies
chips to dodge Lexmark's anti-competitive behavior.
70
Even the trial judge recognized that there were some anti-
competitive reasons for Lexmark's use of an authentication
sequence. In his order for the preliminary injunction, the trial
judge said the following:
To protect the Printer Engine Programs and Toner
Loading Programs and to prevent unauthorized
toner cartridges from being used with Lexmark's
T-Series printers, Lexmark uses an authentication
sequence that runs each time a toner cartridge is
inserted into a Lexmark printer, the printer is
powered on, or whenever the printer is opened and
closed.7'
Despite its ulterior motives, Lexmark persuaded the court
to apply the anti-circumvention provisions to protect
"noncopyrighted consumable goods., 72 This decision will most
likely carry significant repercussions for other markets:
"[e]mploying copyright law or the DMCA to sanction lock-out
methods that protect markets for consumable goods (as opposed to
markets for the copyrighted works themselves) could induce
OEMs in other industries to follow Lexmark's lead, including
'aftermarket' manufacturers of parts for automobiles, computer,
consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment."73
70 Mem. In Opp'n to Motion for Preliminary Inj., Non-Confidential Version, 6,
Lexmark (No. 02-57 1-KSF), available at http://www.scc-inc.com/special
/oemwarfare/lexmark vsscc.htm (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter Static Control Opp'n Brief].
77 Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (emphasis added).
72 Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
73 Static Control Opp'n Brief, supra note 69, at 20.
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In Lexmark, the copyrighted functional components were
lock-out devices. If other companies follow Lexmark's example
by installing and copyrighting similar devices, they can ensure that
only their secondary products will be used. If a company
copyrights internal components of its works and uses the same
authentication sequence to prevent access to those copyrighted
works and to prevent compatibility, it can control a resale market;
competitors cannot compete without violating the anti-
circumvention provisions. In effect, manufacturers can use the
DMCA to behave anti-competitively. Such behavior will lead to
great inefficiency in the replacement parts market and, in turn, will
create higher prices for consumers.
An amicus brief 74 offered by law professors in Lexmark
clearly states what is at risk when using the DMCA in this manner:
If [§] 1201(a) could be applied to such functional
software, [§] 1201(a) could be susceptible to
widespread abuses across a plethora of industries.
For example, could not [§] 1201(a), so interpreted,
enable automobile manufacturers to prevent
competitors from selling replacement oil filters, or
tires that did not have a compatible semiconductor
chip? Or photocopy machine manufacturers to
prevent use of paper that does not bear the correct
watermark? Or computer floppy disks that do not
have an authenticating chip indicating that it was
made by the manufacturer of the floppy drive?
75
The Lexmark court erred in failing to consider the public
policy implications 76 of its decision. If courts allow the anti-
74 Lexmark Amicus Brief, supra note 8.75 Id. at 6.
76 It is also an interesting aside that there are policy concerns related to the
environment, which have led the European Union and North Carolina to
disallow use of prebates on printer cartridges; these environmental concerns
were not discussed in the preliminary injunction order. See DIRECTIVE
2002/96/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF 27 JANUARY
2003 ON WASTE ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIP. ("WEEE") ART. 4,
available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_037
/ 1_03720030213en00240038.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); see H.B. 999, 2003 Leg., 386th Sess. (N.C. 2003).
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circumvention provisions to be used in this manner, a grave
precedent will be set. Many corporations will engage in this anti-
competitive behavior, and consumers and resale product
manufacturers will lose in the process.
ii. Application of the Anti-
Circumvention When Circumvention
Occurs to Establish Compatibility
Because of the way the Lexmark court viewed the case, it
failed to see that there were different policy considerations in this
case than in other cases in which the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions have been applied. Users of the SCC microchip are not
using the technology to gain access to something that they do not
own. Rather, they are using the microchips to put their own
printers to their full use. 7 The SCC microchip affects only the
way that the printer processes. Printer owners are not
implementing chips to get secret access to a good that they do not
own; rather, printer owners are merely trying to get access to their
own printers.
SCC's brief in opposition to Lexmark's motion for a
preliminary injunction differentiated the Lexmark fact scenario
from an example found in a report from the House Committee on
the Judiciary: "The act of circumventing a technological protection
measure put in place by a copyright owner to control access to a
copyrighted work is the electronic equivalent of breaking into a
locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.",78 SCC's
opposition brief argued that, unlike breaking into a room for a
book, "Lexmark's DMCA claim seeks to prevent the owner of a
printer from using the printer-the electronic equivalent of
breaking into a locked room in your own house."
79
For purposes of public policy, the court should have found
that the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions are inapplicable
when a person breaks into his or her own electronic device in order
to gain access to a not independently marketed, functional
77 See Static Control Opp'n Brief, supra note 69, at 24.
78 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. I, 1, at 17 (1998).
79 Static Control Opp'n Brief, supra note 69, at 24.
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component of that device in order to make a non-copyrighted
device compatible with it. The anti-circumvention provisions
should only be used when circumvention of a protection measure
takes placefor the purpose of enabling a person to gain access to
copyrighted material. In Lexmark, the circumvention took place to
facilitate compatibility between a person's property and a non-
copyrighted work. Public policy against anti-competitive behavior
favors disallowing the DMCA to be used in this manner.
B. Proper Application-Real Networks Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc.
80
The Lexmark court failed to consider public policy
concerns when it decided to apply the DMCA. Real Networks is a
case that shows a scenario in which applying the anti-
circumvention provisions is proper in light of public policy. In
Real Networks, a district court granted a preliminary injunction
against Streambox, Inc., preventing it from "manufacturing,
importing, licensing, offering to the public or offering for sale" 81 a
circumvention device known as the Streambox VCR. The
Streambox VCR allowed users to "access and copy RealMedia
files located on RealServers,"8 2 circumventing the protections that
Real Networks had put in place.
In Real Networks, the anti-circumvention provisions were
used to protect copyrighted works in the electronic marketplace,
3
and the Streambox VCR is a device that was primarily designed to
circumvent protections that Real Networks used to effectively
control access to its client's artistic works.8 4 The Streambox VCR
had "only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a protected work., 85 In addition, the devices
80 No. 2:99LV02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
81 Id. at *12.
82 Id. at *4.
83 See supra notes 17-20.
84 Real Networks, 2000 WL 127311, at *8.
85 Id. at *8.
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were marketed for the purpose of circumvention, 86 and the artistic
works, such as song recordings, were tangible works that were
protected by copyrights.
87
In Real Networks there are no public policy concerns that
weigh against application of the anti-circumvention provisions.
Congress included the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions to
protect manufacturers of goods in an emerging medium where
goods are easily stolen and where theft is rarely detected. Real
Networks embodies the ideal scenario in which Congress intended
the anti-circumvention provisions to be used. In Real Networks,
devices were created for the sole purpose of circumventing
technological measures in order to gain access to copyrighted
material. There are no public policy concerns because those who
used the Streambox devices did so solely to gain access to and
steal copyrighted works. In Lexmark, however, those who used
the SCC microchip were not trying to gain access to copyrighted
materials. Rather, printer owners were trying to bypass lock-out
mechanisms in devices they already owned in order to use non-
copyrighted, refilled, prebate printer cartridges.
VII. Future Uses of the Anti-Circumvention Provisions
When Congress was considering the anti-circumvention
provisions, some members were concerned that the provisions
would be used in ways Congress had not intended. Congress
added § 1201(a)(1)(B) and (a)(1)(C) to the DMCA to allay these
fears. These provisions allow the Register of Copyrights to decide
whether to exempt certain activities from § 1201 (a). According to
the provisions, the Register of Copyrights "shall make the
determination ... of whether persons who are users of a
copyrighted work are.., adversely affected by the prohibition
under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfringing uses
under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works." 89
861d. at *8.
871 d. at *2.
88 Static Control Opp'n Brief, supra note 69, at 25.
89 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1998).
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As indicated by § 1201 (a)(1)(B), Congress realized the
potential for misuse of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions.
Lexmark is exactly the type of case over which Congress would
likely have been concerned. Under § 1201(a)(1)(C), the Register
of Copyrights should exempt cases like Lexmark because "user[s]
of copyrighted works," i.e. the consumers, "are likely to be...
adversely affected by the prohibition. .. in their ability to make
noninfringing uses ... of a particular class of copyrighted
works." 90 In other words, when consumers want to refill their
prebate printer cartridges, they cannot do so without infringing
9 1
on Lexmark's copyrighted functional printer components. Thus, if
courts allow the anti-circumvention provisions to be used in this
way, monopolistic schemes similar to those used in Lexmark will
continually succeed. The Register of Copyrights should create an
exception for cases like this one under § 1201(a)(1)(B).
Even in the absence of such affirmative conduct by the
Register of Copyrights, because public policy discourages
outcomes which lead to anti-competitive behavior, courts should
draw distinctions between cases in which circumvention occurs in
order to gain access to a copyrighted work and cases in which
circumvention occurs in order to effect compatibility.
VIII. Conclusion
The confusion surrounding the application of the anti-
circumvention provisions is understandable. Congress wrote the
provisions in broad terms and failed to narrow the scope of the
provisions to protect only independently marketed, not purely
functional, copyrighted works.92 It is highly unlikely, however,
that Congress intended to allow corporations such as Lexmark,
through use of the anti-circumvention provisions, to gain quasi-
monopoly power. As such, courts should consider public policy
and should not apply the anti-circumvention provisions when
doing so would encourage anti-competitive behavior.
90 Id.91 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 957-
58 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
92 See id.
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